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Probability, Justice, and the Risk of Wrongful Conviction 
 
Jeffrey S. Rosenthal 
University of Toronto, Canada 
 
Abstract: We consider the issue of standards of proof in legal decisions from the point of view of probability.  
We compare ``balance of probabilities'' and ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' to the statistical use of p-values.  We 
point out various fallacies which sometimes arise in legal reasoning.  And we provide several examples of legal 
cases which involved probabilities, including some in which incorrect decisions were made and defendants were 
wrongfully convicted.  
Keywords: probability, statistics, p-value, balance of probabilities, beyond a reasonable doubt, standard of 
proof. 
 
Background and Context 
I am a professor of statistics, and most of my work is fairly technical and mathematical (see 
www.probability.ca/jeff/research.html). But one day I wrote a book, Struck by Lightning: The Curious 
World of Probabilities, for the general public, which did unexpectedly well, especially in Canada. I was 
then interviewed by the media about such diverse topics as lottery probabilities, public opinion polls, 
violent crime rates, sports statistics, and more, and was even involved in probing a major lottery retailer 
fraud scandal involving millions of dollars and criminal convictions (see, for example, 
www.probability.ca/lotteryscandal). I was also invited to give talks to all sorts of different groups, from 
insurance brokers to financial investors, from humour therapists to gambling addiction counselors.  
And then one day I was invited to speak to a prominent group of Canadian lawyers and judges. 
This invitation in turn led to others, and I ended up giving five different talks to five different groups of 
lawyers and judges (including the Irish Supreme Court and High Court justices) within a single year. 
This forced me to investigate the connection of probabilities and statistical analysis to the justice system, 
as I will now discuss.  
 
Probability and Justice? 
What is the connection of probability and statistics to justice issues? Well, both topics involve 
evaluating evidence, i.e., determining whether the available information is sufficient to draw certain 
conclusions. This perspective was nicely summarised by the James Bond villain Auric Goldfinger when 
he stated, “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action.”  
In probability and statistics, the possible conclusions might involve medical testing, or 
psychological analysis, or social science studies. We might try to determine if an observed difference is 
“statistically significant”, or if a certain probability is above some threshold, or if a corresponding p-
value is less than some cutoff. In the justice system, the possible conclusions involve such questions as 
guilt or innocence. A court is then tasked with determining if a case has been proven “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”, or (for civil cases) by a “balance of probabilities” or a “preponderance of the 
evidence”. So what do these terms mean, and how are they related?  
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The justice term “balance of probabilities” seems closest to the world of probability and 
statistics. It seems to mean that a certain conclusion is more likely than not. So perhaps that means 
simply that the probability has to be more than 50%? Unfortunately even this connection is not so clear-
cut. A classic example involves 1,000 people attending an event at which only 499 admission fares were 
collected. This means that a randomly-chosen attendee has probability 50.1% of not having paid 
admission. But surely no judge would award damages against a randomly-chosen attendee on that basis. 
Thus, even the simple-seeming “balance of probabilities” standard requires human judgement and 
cannot be interpreted in purely probabilistic terms.  
The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” is even more challenging. It is generally agreed to mean 
something weaker than “certainty”, but something stronger than just “probably”. (For example, the 
Ireland Director of Public Prosecutions web site states: “The judge or jury has to be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a person is guilty. It is not enough for them to think that the accused is probably 
guilty.”) So does this mean the probability of guilt has to be more than 95%? more than 99%? more than 
99.9%? Or that the corresponding p-value (i.e., the probability that we would have observed such 
evidence even if the accused were innocent) must be less than 5% or 1% or 0.1%? Once again, there is 
no clear standard, and the correspondence between probability/statistics and the standards of the justice 
system are hard to pin down.  
Nevertheless, despite these challenges, it does seem that justice issues should be somewhat 
analysable in terms of probabilities and statistics. There are two major risks that need to be avoided: the 
risk of letting a guilty person go free, and (perhaps worse) the risk of wrongly convicting an innocent 
per- son. To explore these risks further, we next review some statistical practices, and then apply them to 
some specific legal cases.  
 
How Statisticians Weigh Evidence 
Consider a concrete example. Suppose your friend claims that she can distinguish Coke from 
Pepsi by taste alone. To test this claim, you pour Coke and Pepsi randomly into a series of glasses, and 
ask her to identify them. Suppose she identifies the first glass correctly (“Coke!”). This provides only 
slight evidence of her abilities, since she could have just gotten lucky. If she then also identifies a second 
glass correctly (“Pepsi!”), the evidence starts to increase. How many glasses in a row must she identify 
correctly before you would be convinced?  
The classical statistical approach to this problem is to consider the p- value, i.e. the probability of 
observing such a result if your friend has no actual abilities and is just guessing randomly. So, if she 
guess right just once, then the p-value equals 1/2, or 50%. If she guesses right twice in a row, the p-value 
becomes (1/2) × (1/2) = 25%, where we multiply because (assuming random guessing) the different 
guesses are independent. If she guesses right five times in a row, the p-value equals (1/2) × (1/2) × (1/2) 
× (1/2) × (1/2) ≈ 3.1%.  
Clearly, smaller and smaller p-values start to suggest that your friend’s guessing wasn’t just luck, 
but rather showed some true ability. But how small should the p-value be, to actually “prove” some 
conclusion? The usual standard, used throughout the medical and social sciences, is that a result is 
“statistically significant” if the p-value less than 5%, i.e. less than one chance in 20. Indeed, each time 
you take a medical drug, you are almost certainly consuming something which has been approved for 
treatment based on some study with some p-value which is less than 5%.  
By this standard, if your friend guesses Coke versus Pepsi correctly twice in a row then this 
proves nothing, while if she guesses correctly five times in a row then this provides statistically 
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significant evidence of her abilities. And, exactly the same reasoning applies to a new cure for a disease 
with a 50% fatality rate, which manages to save five patients in a row.  
So far so good. But such statistical reasoning is not infallible. Sometimes the “evidence” is 
misleading due to incorrect reporting or biased sampling or incomplete recording. And even if the 
evidence is correct, sometimes the calculations or the conclusions are not. 
One issue that arises is the When To Multiply question. That is, when is it appropriate for 
probabilities be multiplied? For example, if the probability of heads on one coin flip is 1/2, then the 
probability of heads on two coin flips is (1/2) × (1/2) = 1/4, because the coin flips are independent so 
multiplica- tion is valid. And in the above Coke/Pepsi example, if your friend is guessing without ability 
and the drinks are poured randomly, then each guess is independent of the next, so multiplication is 
again valid. But not always! For example, 49.2% of Americans are male, and 64% of Americans watch 
NFL football (according to a recent survey). So, does this mean the percentage of Americans who are 
male and watch NFL football is 49.2% × 64% = 31.5%? No, it’s actually 49.2% × 73% = 35.9%, since 
73% of American males (and only 55% of American females) watch NFL football. That is, gender and 
football are not independent, so the multiplication is invalid and leads to too small a probability. I will 
consider this further below.  
In addition, it is important to interpret p-values correctly. If your friend guesses Coke/Pepsi 
correctly five times in a row, then the p-value is 3.1%. This means that if your friend was guessing 
randomly, then the probability they would perform so well is 3.1%. This does not mean that the proba- 
bility your friend was guessing randomly is only 3.1%. These two different probabilities are often 
conflated, which is sometimes called the Prosecutor’s Fallacy. In fact, the probability your friend was 
guessing randomly cannot be determined based on the experiment alone – it also depends on what you 
know or assume about your friend, and many other factors. In any case, it is not the same as the p-value, 
and indeed it could be very different.  
Of even greater concern is multiple testing, or what I call the Out Of How Many principle. For 
example, in my book, Struck by Lightning, I tell the true story of running into my father’s cousin at 
Disney World, an event which seemed like one chance in hundreds of million. However, when you 
consider all the strangers I saw on that trip to Disney World, as well as all the people I would have been 
surprised to run into, it turns out that probability of running into someone surprising during a two-day 
trip to a crowded location is actually more like 0.5%, i.e. not so surprising after all.  
In the context of the Coke/Pepsi experiment, if your friend keeps trying to guess all afternoon, 
and eventually guesses correctly five times in a row, then this proves nothing because they had so many 
chances to achieve this result.  
Similarly, someone winning a lottery jackpot isn’t necessarily suspicious even though they have 
defied odds of one in tens of millions, because of all the other people who bought a lottery ticket and 
could have won instead. The same reasoning applies to all sorts of coincidences and suspicious – or 
surprising – seeming occurrences. That is, an apparently small p-value should always be treated with 
caution when other equally-surprising events were also possible.  
The Prosecutor’s Fallacy, and the When To Multiply question, and the Out Of How Many 
principle, all have important applications to legal cases – as we now discuss.  
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A Legal Case: Sally Clark 
Sally Clark was a solicitor in Cheshire, England. She had two sons, each of whom died in 
infancy with no apparent cause. The first death had been ruled a “cot death”, i.e., a case of Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome (SIDS) in which babies sometimes suffocate without apparent explanation. But when 
the second infant also died, suspicions were raised, and Sally Clark found herself charged with double 
murder.  
The prosecution case rested on probabilities. At her 1999 trial, the pae- diatrician Sir Roy 
Meadow testified that “the odds against two cot deaths in the same family are 73 million to one”. Clark 
was convicted on this basis, put in prison, and vilified in the press. She even had a third son temporarily 
removed from her custody. But was her conviction justified?  
One issue is how the figure “73 million to one” should be interpreted. To the casual observer – or 
to the media, or even to a judge or juror – this might seem to be the probability that Clark is innocent. 
But the figure is actually a p-value, i.e. the probability that a law-abiding parent would have two infants 
die without apparent explanation, which is a rather different thing. Confusing the two is a classic 
example of the Prosecutor’s Fallacy!  
A second issue is whether the figure “73 million to one” was computed correctly. Meadow 
obtained this figure by first saying that the probability of one child dying of SIDS was one chance in 
8,543, and then saying that for two children we have to multiply to get a figure of (1/8, 543) × (1/8, 543) 
= 1/72, 982, 849 ≈ 1/73, 000, 000. However, this multiplication was not valid. Indeed, SIDS tends to run 
in families, so once a family has had one SIDS case, the second one is more likely – just like for male 
football watchers.  
Furthermore, even the figure 1/8,543 for each individual SIDS death was not valid. The overall 
probability of SIDS in the U.K. had been estimated as 1/1,303. Meadow obtained 1/8,543 by “adjusting” 
for family circumstances that lower the SIDS probability (e.g. no smokers, someone employed, mother 
over 26 years old). But he neglected other factors which raise the probability (e.g. that SIDS is twice as 
likely for boys as for girls). So, for all of these reasons, the correct probability of two SIDS deaths in the 
same family was surely higher than the “one in 73 million” figure used in court.  
But most important of all is the Out Of How Many principle. After all, there are tens of millions 
of families in U.K. alone. So, the fact that one of them had two SIDS deaths is not so surprising – much 
like the probability that someone wins the lottery jackpot. To convict solely on the basis of probabilities, 
the chances would have to be so low that we would never expect to see such an occurrence even once in 
any family in the U.K. or perhaps the entire world. By that standard, even a tiny p-value like “one in 73 
million” is, well, not tiny enough. (By contrast, if Sally Clark was already under suspicion for some 
other reason, then a small p-value could well be convincing, since then the Out Of How Many principle 
might not apply.)  
Sally Clark was convicted of double-homicide in November 1999, purely on the basis of 
Meadow’s probability calculation. However, statisticians soon noticed the flaws in the case. The 
venerable Royal Statistical Society noted (see: www.rss.org.uk/uploadedfiles/documentlibrary744.pdf) 
that Meadow’s approach was “statistically invalid”, and declared that “The case of R v. Sally Clark is 
one example of a medical expert witness making a serious statistical error, one which may have had a 
profound effect on the outcome of the case.” For these and other reasons, Clark was ultimately acquitted 
on her second appeal, after more than three years in jail. But she never recovered psychologically, and 
died of alcohol poisoning four years later.  
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Meanwhile, the U.K. General Medical Council ruled that Meadow’s evidence was “misleading 
and incorrect”, and that he was guilty of “serious professional misconduct”. He was effectively barred 
from any future court work. Furthermore, the prosecution pathologist Alan Williams was found to have 
not reported evidence about an infection in the second son (which may have suggest death by natural 
causes). The GMC found him, too, guilty of serious professional misconduct. As a result, several other 
similar convictions were also overturned on appeal. A valuable lesson had been learned.  
 
An Earlier Case: Malcolm Collins 
On June 18, 1964, in Los Angeles, an elderly lady was pushed down in an alley, and her purse 
was stolen. Witnesses said: a young Caucasian woman, with a dark blond ponytail, ran away with the 
purse, into a yellow car, which was driven by a Black man, who had a beard and moustache. Four days 
later, Malcolm and Janet Collins were arrested, primarily because they fit these same characteristics (at 
least mostly – Janet’s hair was apparently light blond rather than dark blond).  
At trial, the prosecutor called “a mathematics instructor at a nearby state college” (whose identity 
no one seems to know). The prosecutor told the mathematics instructor to assume certain “conservative” 
probabilities:  
•Black man with a beard: 1 out of 10 
•Man with moustache: 1 out of 4 
•White woman with blond hair: 1 out of 3  
•Woman with a ponytail: 1 out of 10 
•Interracial couple in car: 1 out of 1,000 
•Yellow car: 1 out of 10  
The mathematics instructor then computed the probability that a random couple would satisfy all 
of these criteria, by – you guessed it – multiplying:  
(1/10)×(1/4)×(1/3)×(1/10)×(1/1000)×(1/10) = 1/12,000,000  
It was thus asserted that there was just one chance in 12 million that a couple would have these 
same characteristics if they were not guilty. Malcolm Collins was convicted at trial, primarily based on 
this “one in 12 million” probability.  
Was this probability calculation valid? Surely not. For one thing, those individual probabilities 
were just assumed, without evidence. Furthermore, the multiplication was again invalid: for example, 
most men who have beards also have moustaches, so (like the male football watchers) these factors are 
surely not independent. (And, if you have a Black man and a White woman, then of course you have an 
interracial couple! Perhaps the prosecutor may have meant that one in 10 Black men have beards, not 
that one man in 10 is Black with a beard, but the interpretation is rather difficult to sort out.) So, the 
asserted probability of “one in 12 million” is highly questionable.  
Even more important, once again, is the Out Of How Many principle. Los Angeles County in 
1964 had a population of 6,537,000, and thus approximately one million couples (which could termed 
the “suspect population”). So, even with odds as small as one in 12 million, the probability of there 
being two such couples is actually fairly large. To convict Malcolm Collins on the basis of probabilities 
alone seems inappropriate in this case.  
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The case of Malcolm Collins eventually made its way to the Supreme Court of California. Their 
1968 judgment (found here: scholar.google.com/scholarcase?case=2393563144534950884) began, “We 
deal here with the novel question whether evidence of mathematical probability has been properly 
introduced and used”. They rightly observed that “the testimony as to mathematical probability infected 
the case with fatal error”. However, they then further insisted that the trial’s probability calculations had 
“distorted the jury’s traditional role of determining guilt or innocence according to long-settled rules”, 
concluding that “Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society1, while assisting the trier 
of fact in the search for truth, must not cast a spell over him. We conclude that on the record before us 
defendant should not have had his guilt determined by the odds”. They overturned the conviction on that 
basis. Now, I am glad that the conviction was overturned, due to the flaws in the probabilistic reasoning. 
But I wish they hadn’t implied that guilt should never be determined by the odds – I disagree and think 
that is going too far.  
 
Another Case: Lucia de Berk 
Lucia de Berk was a nurse who worked on three different hospital wards in The Hague, 
Netherlands. She was arrested after it was discovered that she was on duty for 14 of 27 “incidents” (i.e. 
patient deaths or near-deaths) in her three wards (51.9%), despite working just 203 of the 2,694 shifts in 
her three wards (7.5%). At her trial, the prosecution asserted that there was just one chance in 342 
million that such an imbalance would occur by chance alone. de Berk was convicted of multiple murders 
and attempted murders in March 2003, primarily on the basis of this “1 in 342 million” probability. Was 
her conviction justified?  
A first question is whether the evidence (i.e. facts) were accurate. There was some controversy 
about whether all of these incidents had actually taken place during de Berk’s shifts, as opposed to just 
before or just afterwards. Furthermore, the definition of “near-death” might have been adjusted post hoc 
to include more incidents during de Berk’s shifts. Related to this, de Berk may have been assigned to 
extra elderly/terminal patients due to her experience as a nurse, which may have provided an alternative 
explanation of any excess number of incidents. These issues were all debated vigorously following her 
conviction.  
In addition to the above, many of our previous concerns apply. Once again, the Prosecutor’s 
Fallacy must be avoided: the probability that de Berk is guilty given the observed facts is quite different 
from the probability that the observed facts would have arisen if she were innocent. Even more 
important is the Out Of How Many principle. The prosecution statistician, Henk Elffers, had tried to 
account for this by multiplying by 27 (the number of nurses in one of the hospitals), but arguably he 
should really have multiplied by the number of nurses in the entire Netherlands or even the whole world.  
After de Berk’s conviction, various statisticians objected. In particular, four Dutch statisticians 
alluded to the Out Of How Many principle by saying “the data . . . is used twice: first to identify the 
suspect, and after that again in the computations of Elffers’ probabilities” (Meester, Collins, Gill & 
Lambalgen, 2006). They made numerous “adjustments”, and eventually increased the p-value from “1 in 
342 million” to 0.022 (i.e. 1 chance in 45), a p-value which is surely too large for conviction.  
de Berk’s convictions were upheld on first appeal in 2004. However, enough doubts had been 
raised about the probability calculations that the conviction was upheld primarily on other grounds, 
notably elevated digoxin levels in some of the corpses (which could be evidence of poisoning). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  If they thought society was “computerized” in 1968, what would they think today? 
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However, the hypothesis of digoxin poisoning was disproven by 2007, leading to the case being 
reopened in 2008, and a not guilty verdict being delivered on second appeal in 2010. Lucia de Berk is 
now a free woman.  
Of course, none of this precludes the possibility that Lucia de Berk might have been guilty. For 
example, she may have killed some terminal patients out of mercy, to relieve their suffering in their final 
days. Indeed, on the day of one of her elderly patient’s death, de Berk wrote in her diary that she had 
“given in to her compulsion” (though she later claimed she was referring to her compulsion to read Tarot 
cards). While this fact was introduced at her trial, her conviction was based primarily on the statistical 
evidence. And, as we have seen, the statistical evidence wasn’t sufficiently convincing.  
  
Discussion 
I have presented three different legal cases where people were convicted of serious crimes 
primarily on the basis of faulty probability calculations. It may be tempting for some people to conclude 
from this – as the Supreme Court of California perhaps did in 1968 – that probabilities should never be 
used to convict anyone of anything.  
I think that this is going too far, and that statistical analysis can sometimes help to achieve justice 
after all, provided that it is used with caution. One example of this is the lottery retailer scandal 
mentioned earlier. In that case, I was able to determine that lottery retailer ticket sellers had won more 
major lottery prizes than could be reasonably explained by chance alone. This conclusion became a huge 
news story in Canada, and led to millions of dollars in lottery repayments, and several criminal 
convictions for fraud (see www.probability.ca/lotteryscandal). This illustrates how careful statistical 
calculations which take into account the factors mentioned above can identify criminal activity and 
achieve justice.  
An interesting related story is that of Waneta & Tim Hoyt. They had five babies in New York 
State during 1965 – 1971, all of whom died in infancy (at 3, 28, 1.5, 2.5, and 2.5 months old, 
respectively). The deaths were all identified as SIDS, and indeed a pediatrician used them to publish a 
scholarly article about SIDS’ strong genetic linkage (Steinschneider, 1972). Apparently no foul play was 
suspected, and in fact the Hoyts were later allowed to adopt a son (who survived to adulthood) in 1977. 
Years later, in 1985, some prosecutors and pathologists became suspicious, and investigated. Eventually, 
Waneta Hoyt confessed to suffocating all five of the children, to stop them from crying. She later 
“recanted” her confession, but was nevertheless convicted in 1985 of five murders; she died in prison in 
1998 at the age of 52. It would appear, at least in hindsight, that her murderous ways should have been 
detected much sooner – but instead the genetic linkage was believed so strongly that even five deaths 
were not considered suspicious.  
As these examples illustrate, it is difficult to decide when probabilistic evidence is sufficient to 
justify a criminal conviction. The calculation and interpretation of p-values is often challenging. Overly 
aggressive or simplistic calculations run the risk of convicting innocent people, while overly cautious 
analyses run the risk of setting guilty parties free. Alternatively, it is possible to take a Bayesian 
approach to this question (see, for example, Meester et al., 2006, section 6), but that requires specifying 
prior probabilities which is itself problematic and subjective.  
Nevertheless, I do believe that probabilities can and should be used in criminal trials (among 
other places). Such probabilities must be carefully computed, accounting for such issues as the accuracy 
of the data, the When To Multiply question, the Prosecutor’s Fallacy, and (perhaps most important of 
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all) the Out Of How Many principle. If all of these factors are carefully taken into account, then 
probabilities can indeed be used to draw conclusions and avoid risks, even about criminal activity.  
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